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Abstract 
Compliance with laws and regulations intended to protect common pool resources in the urban 
context is essential in tackling problems such as pollution and congestion. A high level of non-
compliance necessitates investigation into motivations behind compliance. The long-held 
instrumental theory emphasizing the dependence of compliance on tangible deterrence measures 
fails to adequately explain empirical findings. More recently established compliance models 
incorporate normative, instrumental, and image factors as motivations for compliance. We 
investigate the importance of normative and image motivations for transportation policy 
compliance, and the influence of the hukou (China’s household registration) on the composition 
of motivations. Through a case study of Shanghai’s license auction policy to inhibit car growth, 
we use a structural equation model and data from a survey (n = 1,389) of policy attitudes and 
compliance behavior. The results show that both locals and migrants comply because of 
instrumental motivation. However, for locals, normative and image motivations not only 
influence compliance but do so to a greater degree than instrumental motivations. This stands in 
stark contrast with that there was no statistical relationship between normative and image 
motivations and compliance for migrants. The significant contribution of normative and image 
motivations to compliance in locals bears positive implications for compliance, but the absence 
of that in migrants is worrying. If only instrumental motivations matter, then the government is 
really constrained in how it can go about keeping social order. Compliance obtained strictly 
through social control indicates an unsustainable state of governance. 
 
 
Keywords: policy compliance, instrumental motivation, normative motivation, image motivation, 
migrants 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Compliance with laws and regulations protecting common pool resources (CPR) is critical to 
ensuring sustainability. As Garrett Hardin described in “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968), 
growing demand for use of the commons—mostly referring to environmental resources such as 
rivers, lakes, oceans, and the atmosphere—would reach the inflection point where advancements 
in technology cannot adequately increase efficiency to meet growing demand. Hence 
policymakers have used laws and regulations to protect the commons. 
Although economics literature cites natural resources as examples of CPR, man-made 
objects like the roads are also examples of CPR (Coughlin, 1994). When excessive numbers of 
cars appear on the road, the “Tragedy of the Commons” is manifested in congestion and 
pollution. Cities in developing countries have recently seen astronomical increases in car 
ownership. Governments have adopted car ownership control policies such as the car license 
plate auction policy instituted in Shanghai (Chen and Zhao, 2013). However, a significant 
fraction of drivers in Shanghai (28% of those surveyed) obtain license plates from neighboring 
municipalities rather than participating in the auction. A high non-compliance level leads to three 
potential undesirable consequences: dilution of the ability to control vehicles, loss of auction 
revenue, and loss of public faith in the government’s ability to enforce regulations. 
High noncompliance necessitates research into why people fail to comply and how to 
alter the policy approach. Compliance is necessary for effective governance, yet it is difficult to 
secure because most laws dictate behavior that citizens would rather avoid (Tyler, 2006).  
Compliance with policies protecting CPR, from the instrumental perspective, could be especially 
difficult to secure because the severity of punishment is relatively limited and the cost of raising 
the perceived probability of apprehension is high (Martin, 2012; Tyler, 2006). Therefore, other 
motivations to comply ought to be investigated. Theories developed and evidence collected since 
the 1990s have shown that other motivations—particularly normative and image motivation—
play major roles in compliance (Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein, 2015). Based on Ostrom’s 
groundbreaking work on voluntary cooperation in protecting CPR (1990), various studies of 
fisheries and forests have shown the presence of other types of motivations in additional to 
instrumental motivation in compliance. However, no study has used the comprehensive 
compliance model integrating normative motivation, instrumental motivation, and image 
motivation to study compliance with transportation policy intended to reduce congestion and 
pollution. Through data analysis of survey responses given to car owners in Shanghai, this paper 
attempts to answer the following questions about common pool resource regulation compliance 
in the realm of transportation: 
1. How do normative and image motivations influence compliance?  
2. How do normative and image motivations vary with socioeconomic attributes? 
3. How does residence status (locals vs. migrants) modulate the way in which normative 
and image motivations influence compliance? 
The results shed lights on the possibilities to improve compliance of the auction policy to 
further mitigate congestion and pollution as well as to raise auction revenue. More importantly, 
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through the lens of analyzing compliance with a car control policy, this study provides a 
steppingstone in understanding and establishing conditions that promote compliance with 
common pool resource protection policies in general. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Compliance Theory 
Compliance with laws and regulations is motivated by three sets of factors: instrumental 
motivation, normative motivation, and image motivation (Tyler, 2006). The instrumental 
perspective of compliance, stemming from the theory of social control, rests on the assumption 
that external rewards and punishments motivate behavior. Social control theory has received 
support from the public choice perspective, in which economic models are applied to legal 
studies. In applying the economic model of crime and punishment, where the choice of crime 
depends on the expected net benefits (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970), policymakers assume that 
compliance behavior is driven by the same type of instrumental determinants that motivate 
rational decision-making in other parts of people’s lives. If the instrumental perspective is indeed 
all encompassing, then governance becomes controlling societal resources to deter non-
compliance and it would be relatively straightforward—albeit costly—for the government to 
implement its agenda. The instrumental perspective, however, has proven insufficient in 
explaining free-rider problems like tax evasion, where the rate of tax evasion predicted by the 
expected utility model far exceeds the actual rate of tax evasion, so there other factors warrant 
consideration (Tyler, 2006). 
Two additional sources of influence are widely recognized as determinants of 
compliance: personal values and the judgment of other people (Ariely et al, 2009). The impact of 
personal values on compliance is known as normative motivation. Normative factors are related 
not to rewards and punishments, but to the relationship between choices and one’s perception of 
appropriateness. Due to normative motivation, citizens may voluntarily comply. The judgment of 
other people, also known as image motivation, is both instrumental and normative. Peer groups 
and others can wield their judgments through the manipulation of both material resources such as 
job opportunities or intangible resources such as respect (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Tyler, 2006). 
Since image motivation is both normative and instrumental and deviates from personal values, it 
must be considered as a distinct type of motivation.  
The inclusion of the three types of motivations is insufficient in understanding 
compliance. The interactions among the three types of motivations must also be considered. 
Benabou and Tirole (2006) established a model incorporating all three types of motivation and 
derived conditions under which extrinsic factors such as government or organizational incentives 
could crowd out intrinsic motivation toward prosocial behavior or the positive image associated 
with prosocial behavior. The crowding effects among various types of motivations, while not 
explored in this study, play important roles in environmental protection policy and have been 
extensively examined. 
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The compliance model contains critical additions to the Theory of Planned Behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991), which is frequently used to model behavior in transport. According to the Theory 
of Planned Behavior, behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and control beliefs create the intent to 
perform a behavior, which then leads to actual behavior assuming a sufficient degree of control. 
Normative beliefs refer to only social norms. Behavioral studies conducted after the publication 
of the Theory of Planned Behavior have shown that personal norms should also be included 
(Beck and Ajzen, 1991), including behavior in transport (Parker et al, 1995). The compliance 
model considers personal norms not only in terms of personal morality, but also legitimacy, a 
feature that is directly controlled by legal authorities that holds potential to increase compliance. 
Therefore the compliance model is not only more comprehensive in modeling behavior but also 
more useful to legal authorities interested in obtaining greater compliance. 
Legitimacy and Morality as Normative Motivations 
A comprehensive compliance model includes both socioeconomic and demographic attributes 
and motivation constructs—normative, instrumental, and image motivation—as explanatory 
variables for compliance. Furthermore, two types of normative motivation need to be explored: 
legitimacy and morality (Tyler, 2006). Legitimacy-motivated compliance arises from a belief 
that an entity has the authority to make and enforce laws (Easton, 1958; Friedman, 1975). 
Morality-motivated compliance refers to a sense to obey because the individual deems a 
particular law as just. Legitimacy is a more reliable motivation for normative compliance 
because the idea that the government has the right to enact laws promotes compliance over a 
broad scope of laws, giving discretionary authority to the government. Morality, on the other 
hand, can either increase or decrease voluntary compliance depending on whether the law aligns 
with the individual’s personal values. The broader and more flexible reach of legitimacy gives 
researching legitimacy great appeal to policymakers interested in raising compliance, and indeed 
legitimacy was universally used—through measuring either the conventional concept of 
perceived obligation to obey or proxies like the perceived degree of public participation 
(Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein, 2015; Madrigal-Ballestero et al, 2012)— in models 
concerning compliance with common pool resource protection policies.  
Compliance Models in Environmental Protection and Transport Behavior 
The inadequacy of the economists’ approach to understanding behavior through the instrumental 
perspective and the importance of considering the normative perspective in studying transport 
policies, particularly those aimed at protecting common goods such as congestion pricing and 
carbon taxation, are delineated by Metcalfe and Dolan (2012). This paper considers lessons from 
recent advancements in behavior economics in conjunction with literature about protection of 
other types of resources in modeling compliance as a combination of three types of motivations: 
normative, instrumental, and image. Furthermore, normative motivation bifurcated into two 
constructs: legitimacy and morality. Hence this model decomposes compliance motivation into 
four constructs: legitimacy, morality, instrumental, and image motivations. 
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Compliance models based solely on the instrumental theory such as the red-light running 
incidence study by Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2001), though failed to provide a complete 
understanding of motivations behind compliance, provided fruitful insights into non-compliance. 
Results suggesting that the elasticity of violation with respect to both fines and probability of 
detection is negative support Becker’s theory in transport research and agrees with findings from 
more complete models in which deterrence is one of multiple motivators of compliance. More 
importantly, the suggestion that the driver’s perception of the fine depends on his/her wealth 
provides implications in accordance with the theory posited by Polinsky and Shavell (1991) that 
the optimal fine be set according to personal wealth.  
The comprehensive compliance studies provide better examples. Studies on public 
participation in regulatory turtle egg harvesting in Costa Rica (Madrigal-Ballestero et al, 2012), 
forest regulation compliance in Ghana (Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein, 2015), agro-
environmental regulation compliance in Denmark (Winter and May, 2001), fisheries regulations 
compliance in Tanzania (Eggert and Lokina, 2010), in Malaysia (Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998), in 
Denmark (Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003), and in the Netherlands (Groeneveld, 2011), and a 
combination of agricultural and environmental regulations in Spain (Martin et al, 2012) all utilize 
survey questions pertaining to normative considerations, instrumental considerations, and image 
considerations as well as socio-demographic attributes to detect factors influencing compliance. 
In traffic laws, Yagil studied the influence of normative and instrumental motivations for 
compliance in Israel. In one study, Yagil (1998b) found that while young and male drivers 
exhibited lower normative motivations to comply with traffic laws, normative motivations 
played a greater role in their compliance than in the compliance of female and older drivers. In a 
similar study of soldiers, Yagil found that younger drivers exhibited lower motivation, both 
instrumental and normative, than older drivers to comply; however, normative motivation better 
predicted compliance in young drivers and instrumental in older drivers (1998a). Yagil’s use of 
demographic variables in gender and age and his suggestion that socioeconomic attributes be 
considered motivated the use of these variables in this study. 
Xie and Parker investigated the role of legitimacy in compliance in transport (2002) in a 
study of factors causing traffic violations in China. The study concluded that the sense of social 
hierarchy, tendency to challenge authority, and belief in the importance of interpersonal 
networks all play critical roles in traffic violations. Xie and Parker’s study validated the division 
of normative motivation into legitimacy and morality in this study. 
Summary of Literature Review 
The currently accepted model of compliance comprises of three forms of motivation: normative, 
instrumental, and image. In comparison with the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), 
normative motivation is analogous to attitude toward behavior, the penalty component of 
instrumental motivation is analogous to behavioral belief; the cost of compliance component of 
instrumental motivation is analogous to perceived behavioral control and control beliefs; and 
image motivation is analogous to normative beliefs and subjective norms. Although the 
motivating factors are categorized differently, this model has been applied to studying many 
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common pool resource protection policy compliance cases. The results have mostly shown that 
the three forms of motivation indeed factor in compliance. Particularly in transportation, Yagil’s 
work on normative and image motivation demonstrated the need to further investigate these 
motivations. Hence the three-factor compliance model was adopted for this study. As literature 
shows, gender and age are fundamental demographic factors to be explored. This paper also 
explores the length of residency as a demographic factor since it is available in survey data and 
one could intuitively hypothesize that the length of residency is positively related to image 
motivation. For socioeconomic attributes, Polinsky and Shavell’s work (1991) suggests that 
income and employment status be explored; Becker’s work (1968) suggests education be 
explored; and China’s unique feature of urban residency status (hukou) is studied. 
 
3. SHANGHAI’S LICENSE PLATE AUCTION POLICY 
Shanghai uses a monthly car license plate auction policy to limit the number of license plates 
issued. Vehicles with nonlocal plates are banned from driving on elevated roads during peak 
hours (Monday-Friday 7:30-9:30 a.m. and 4:30-6:30 p.m.). In 2011, traffic control photographic 
systems were installed to catch violators. Violators will be fined 200 CNY (median monthly 
household income is around 12,500 CNY according to this survey) and deducted 3 credits from 
their drivers’ licenses. An accumulation of up to twelve credits results in fines only. Having 
accumulated between twelve and twenty-four credits, the driver must pay the fine as well as 
attend classes and pass tests to regain driving privileges.  
For brevity, vehicles with non-local license plates will be referred to as non-local vehicles 
from hereon. This study treats any driver with non-local vehicles as violators of the auction 
policy even though only driving non-local vehicles during peak hours is banned. The law dictates 
that all residents of Shanghai participate in the auction when obtaining a vehicle, so while 
driving non-local vehicles during off-peak hours results in no penalty, it violates the spirit of the 
law that all residents obtain Shanghai license plates. More importantly, the government uses 
auction revenue for transportation projects. Avoidance of the auction, even without congestion 
and pollution considerations, is a form of free riding. Thus any participant driving non-local 
vehicles is considered a violator. 
 
4. METHOD 
Questionnaire Survey in Shanghai 
Shanghai Online Market Research Corporation Ltd. (OMRC), which operates the online survey 
platform www.51poll.com distributed a questionnaire on behalf of the research team. Samples 
were selected from a database of 100,000 individuals living in Shanghai. E-mails were sent 
containing the survey invitation and link. Potential respondents were offered incentives of 10 
CNY for completing the questionnaire. The questions on the questionnaire used in this study 
were selected after an initial test survey (Chen and Zhao, 2013). This survey was conducted in 
two waves. The first wave was conducted in September 2012, for which OMRC sent invitations 
to 10,930 randomly selected individuals. 6,120 viewed the e-mails, 3,672 clicked the 
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questionnaire link, and 1,000 completed the questionnaire. Due to the disproportionally high 
presence of car owners among the respondents in the first wave, a booster wave focused on non-
car owners was conducted to bring sample characteristics closer to those of the population. The 
second wave was conducted in November 2012, for which OMRC sent invitations to 10,783 
randomly selected individuals. 9,120 viewed the e-mails, 5,483 clicked the link, and 500 
completed the questionnaire. After combining responses from the two waves and weighting for 
accuracy and representativeness of the population, 1389 records were selected for the final 
dataset. Of those, the 721 respondents (52%) who owned at least one car were selected for this 
study.  
Respondents were asked to provide socio-demographic information, and answer 
questions about their awareness of the policy, vehicle ownership, travel behavior, attitude toward 
the auction policy, attitude toward non-local licensed cars, and attitude toward car ownership as 
well as car dependence. Most questions were presented as statements to which respondents were 
asked indicate the extent of their agreement with the statement on 5-level Likert scale indicators. 
The five levels were strongly agree, partially agree, neutral, partially disagree, and strongly 
disagree, coded 1 through 5 respectively. For this model, scores for all statements were rescaled 
to test the hypothesis that all four latent variables have positive relationships with compliance. In 
addition, a question about weekly usage of vehicles on elevated roads during peak hours was 
included. The hypothesis with usage is that greater usage would positively relate to compliance 
since greater usage would mean more fines for a non-local vehicle. 
 
Motivation Constructs and Compliance Variable Representation 
Compliance was coded as a binary variable with violation = 0 and compliance = 1. Both multi-
car owners with at least one non-local car and single-non-local car owners were considered 
violators. This model included three motivations: normative, instrumental, and image; these three 
motivations were represented by four latent variables and one observed variable. Normative 
motivation bifurcated into legitimacy and morality, each represented by one latent variable. 
Whereas Tyler (2006) used a set of statements querying the individual’s perception of obligation 
to obey to measure legitimacy, using confirmatory factor analysis to remove inappropriate 
statements called for this study the use of one statement about personal sense of obligation and 
one statement about expectation of others’ sense of obligation. Morality is defined as the degree 
to which people consider a particular law appropriate, irrespective of penalties or rewards. 
Statements about further measures to eliminate non-local vehicles were used for morality. It is 
likely that if the respondent deems a greater enforcement of the policy appropriate, then he views 
the original, less stringent enforcement level, as acceptable.  
Most compliance models follow Becker’s expected utility theory and measure 
instrumental motivation using statements regarding the perceived probability of detection, 
expected penalty, and cost of compliance and/or benefit of noncompliance. The probability of 
detection is this case is a constant because the photographic traffic surveillance system catches 
all non-local license plates. The variable cost of noncompliance is the penalty set at 200 CNY 
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per violation. The fixed cost of noncompliance consists of both the relative inconvenience of 
obtaining nonlocal license plates and the additional cost borne by nonlocal local vehicles during 
biannual checks required of all vehicles. For local vehicles the fee is 200 CNY per check; for 
nonlocal vehicles the fee is 1000 CNY per check. To measure instrumental motivation in this 
study, two variables—one latent, one observed—were used to cover the differences in cost 
between local and nonlocal vehicles. An observed variable of weekly usage of vehicles on 
elevated roads during peak hours (greater usage means greater fines incurred) addresses the 
variable additional cost of nonlocal vehicles. A latent variable addresses the fixed additional cost 
of nonlocal vehicles in the form of differences in vehicle checks and ease of purchasing a 
nonlocal vehicle. The bid price of Shanghai license plates fluctuates and therefore so does the 
benefit of using nonlocal license plates; hence, the expected benefit was not included in this 
model. 
Image statements closely follow the definition of image in Tyler (2006) and of reputation 
in Benabou and Tirole (2006) in querying about the psychological benefit of social approval and 
acceptance for having a Shanghai license plate. Table 1 shows the indicators of the four 
motivation constructs as latent variables and an observed motivation variable in this compliance 
model as well as their distributions.  
The variables measured in this model do not reflect the full range of factors considered in 
compliance models. As mentioned, legitimacy is a more encompassing term than simply the 
obligation to obey; studies have also shown that support for authorities is indicative of legitimacy 
(Johnson et al, 2014). In addition, expected benefit could not be measured to fully reflect 
instrumental motivation; the latent variable for instrumental motivation only concerns the 
relative convenience of local vehicles. The latent variables therefore are referred to as obligation, 
spirit, and convenience rather than legitimacy, morality, and instrumental motivation to 
acknowledge data limitations and to avoid extrapolation. 
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TABLE 1 about here 
 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Attributes 
We included both demographic attributes such as age, gender and birthplace, and socioeconomic 
attributes as exogenous variables. Given the possible psychological impact of Shanghai license 
plates on local residents, whether the respondent was born in Shanghai were incorporated. 
Socioeconomic attributes included education, employment status, income, and hukou, a 
socioeconomic attribute unique to China. Hukou is a household registration system that identifies 
every person by name, birth date, gender, and the official location of residence (city and 
province) and type (urban or rural).  
Variations of this registration system began more than two thousand years ago in China 
to provide a base for taxation and conscription. In 1950s, the Chinese government officially 
promulgated the family register system to control the movement of people between urban and 
rural areas. An additional function of hukou is that government can use it to indirectly control the 
migration of rural workers to cities (Afridi et al, 2015) by differentiating the package of social 
welfare granted to urban and rural workers. Urban hukou holders enjoy more employment 
opportunities, ration stamps, and other benefits such as subsidized housing, health services, and 
education. This disparity keeps many rural residents away from the city. Since households 
passed on hukou to future generations, hukou establishes an institutional and inherent disparity in 
socioeconomic mobility through different opportunities in education and eventually employment. 
Since economic reforms began in the late 1970s, rural migration to urban areas has increased but 
the separation of opportunities and benefits between urban and rural hukou holders has persisted. 
The primary socioeconomic distinction in China between rural and urban residents has therefore 
transformed into one between rural and urban hukou holders in urban areas (Afridi et al, 2015). 
The impact of hukou on compliance with many types of laws and regulations is often significant. 
However, only limited literature on the impact of hukou on transport behavior is available. One 
study (Zhang et al, 2013) showed that rural hukou holders exhibited lower overall risk of traffic 
accidents but higher risk of severe/fatal accidents.  
For the purposes of this study, the aggregate sample was separated into Shanghai hukou 
holders (referred to as locals for simplicity) and holders of other hukou (referred to as migrants). 
We hypothesized that the difference in social welfare granted to locals and migrants would yield 
in different strengths in the relationships between compliance and the perceived legitimacy of 
authorities and perceived morality of the laws and regulations. In addition, the fact that non-local 
hukou holders were mostly born outside of Shanghai would yield a weaker relationship between 
image motivation and compliance.  
 
TABLE 2 about here 
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Structural Equation Model 
Studies of vehicle ownership based on data pertaining to attitudes, perceptions, and behavior are 
appropriate applications of structural equations models (Golob, 2003). This compliance model is 
a structural equation model (SEM) defined by the following relationships: 
1. Compliance is affected by four latent variables and one observed variable representing the 
five motivation constructs. Each type of motivation is measured by a set of survey questions 
listed in Table 1. 
2. Compliance is also affected by 9 demographic and socioeconomic attributes listed in Table 2. 
3. Each type of motivation is affected by all 9 attributes to explore the influence of these 
attributes on each type of motivation. Each of these attributes was treated as a dummy 
variable. 
4. Each latent variable also correlates with the other three. This was to account for possible 
interactions among the four constructs within a particular individual to better fit the model. 
The modulating effect of hukou on compliance through the motivations is explored by dividing 
the sample into Shanghai hukou holders (locals) and non-holders (migrants) and examining the 
relationships between motivations and compliance for each group. The division of the sample 
yielded two models: one model for the aggregate sample and a two-group model for locals and 
migrants.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 about here 
 
The SEM diagram is illustrated in Figure 1. The model was estimated in Mplus (Muthén 
and Muthén, 2007) using the maximum likelihood estimator. The modulating effect was 
investigated by running a model that divides sample into locals and migrants. The Multiple 
Group Analysis in Mplus was used so that the scales of the error term are the same for both 
subgroups and the coefficients are therefore comparable. The goodness of fit measures for all 
three models are listed below: 
 
TABLE 3 about here 
 
Both the comparative fit index and the Tucker Lewis index are approximately greater than 0.9. 
The root mean square residual is less than 0.05 (Bentler and Bonett, 1980). The measures of 
goodness of fit therefore indicate strong fit (Maccallum et al, 1996).  
The factor scores listed below in Table 4 show that the indicators served as good 
measures of the latent variables (all significant at 0.01 level). 
 
TABLE 4 about here 
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5. RESULTS 
 
Relationships Between Motivations and Compliance for Locals 
 
While the model imposes causality from motivation constructs to compliance behavior, it is 
possible that behavior also influences motivations. Thus the results of this study only explore 
associations rather than directional causality; the SEM however does control for confounding 
factors such as demographic and socioeconomic attributes. Table 5 shows that for local residents, 
the perceived obligation to obey (legitimacy) is positively related to compliance. Similarly, 
support for the spirit of the policy against non-local vehicles (morality) by supporting the 
government in further restricting non-local vehicles is also positively related to compliance. The 
expected frequency of using elevated roads during peak hours (representative of the variable cost 
of noncompliance) is positively related to compliance. Finally, the positive image of Shanghai 
license plates is positively related to compliance. The positive relationships confirm the intuitive 
hypothesis that greater motivation to comply is positively related with greater likelihood of 
compliance and agree with the results of most studies of common pool resource protection 
policies illustrating the importance of all three types of motivations. 
The standardized results reflect the relative importance of the various types of 
motivations. As Table 5 shows, support for further enforcement in the spirit of the policy and the 
sense of obligation to obey, both of which constitute normative motivation, exhibit stronger 
linkages to compliance than instrumental motivation variables. 
TABLE 5 about here 
 
Differences in Motivations to Comply Between Locals and Migrants 
The modulating effect of hukou on compliance through motivations is quite telling because the 
contrast in motivations for compliance between locals and migrants is stark. Table 5 shows that 
locals are most motivated to comply due to normative considerations (morality and legitimacy), 
followed by avoidance of the penalty (variable cost), and lastly by image considerations. 
Migrants, however, comply only because of avoiding the penalty. Normative and image factors 
do not influence migrants’ decisions to comply. On the aggregate level, since locals make up a 
much higher fraction of the total population than migrants (63% to 37%), the influence of 
normative and image motivations on compliance for the aggregate sample is still statistically 
significant even though they are not for the migrants.  
 
Relationships Between Demographic and Socioeconomic Attributes and Motivations 
Rarely explored in the literature on compliance are the relationships between demographic and 
socioeconomic attributes and different types of motivation. These relationships for the aggregate 
population are shown in Table 6. The structural equations for the aggregate population rather 
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than those for each group are examined to explore potential divisions in the population in 
addition to hukou. 
 
TABLE 6 about here 
 
There are two significant findings at the .05 level. First, having a college education is, however, 
negatively associated with agreement to further restrict non-local vehicles in Shanghai. Second, 
people at the two ends of the age spectrum (under 30 and over 60) had significant negative 
relationships with the frequency of using elevated roads during peak hours, presumably because 
the activity pattern for these people place less demand for car based travel during peak hours. 
We note some findings at the 0.08 level that, whilst falling short of the desirable 
levels of statistical significance, are suggestive of the veracity of the model. Local-born 
residents are more likely to support further restriction as they are more inclined to protect the 
sanctity of the local license plate. Having been born in Shanghai is also positively related to the 
driver’s perception of the image associated with having Shanghai license plates whereas hukou 
had no significant influence on image motivation. Given that hukou is a government-imposed 
stratification whereas being born in a particular locale is an innate status, that birthplace rather 
than hukou is significantly influences image motivation came as no surprise to the research team. 
In addition, having high income is negatively related to the fixed cost of purchasing nonlocal 
vehicles—represented by the relative perceived convenience of local vehicles. In other words, 
those with high income find owning nonlocal vehicles less inconvenient, presumably because 
fines makes up a smaller proportion of their income, making them less sensitive to the fine. The 
negative relationship between income and fixed cost agrees with the literature on instrumental 
compliance.  
 
6. DISCUSSIONS 
Although this study is the first to investigate motivations behind compliance with a distinct form 
of transportation regulation, the results of this study partially fell in alignment with those of 
studies of other types of regulations in other areas of the world. The sample is much more 
demographically and socioeconomically diverse than the Scandinavian fishermen studied in 
marine regulation compliance models. The potential consequences of violation are much less 
severe than those of traffic violations like speeding—and certainly much less than those of drunk 
driving (Yagil, 1998a, 1998b). However, these results confirmed hypotheses about factors 
relevant to compliance and to each motivation construct for local residents.  
The license plate auction policy offers a distinct perspective on compliance. The bid price 
of a license plate has exceeded $15,000 at one point, meaning that obtaining just a license plate 
is about as costly as purchasing a car. The magnitude of the gains of violation makes this case 
study comparable to something like tax evasion instead of ordinary traffic violations. Yet, 
violations of the policy are treated like traffic violations. The penalties of violation are benign in 
the sense that the penalty involves only a fine and points on the driver’s license; no criminal 
charges are brought against the violator. These features of the license plate auction policy 
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captures the quintessential dilemma of common pool resource protection: the consequences are 
severe, yet the punishments are limited, so it is critical that something must influence people to 
voluntarily comply. The presence of normative and image motivations to comply is crucial To 
that end, the results of this study offer both reassurance and pessimism in that locals are very 
strongly influenced by normative and image motivations whereas migrants are not influenced by 
normative and image motivations at all. 
The major findings of this study are the following. First, monetary rewards and 
punishments, which are instrumental in nature, influence everyone’s decision to comply with the 
law, as economists predicted that they would. However, for those with local residence status 
(local hukou) normative motivations and image motivation also influence compliance with the 
law. In fact, normative motivations are more strongly related to compliance than instrumental 
motivations. Second, those without local residence status (migrants) do not comply because of 
normative motivations and image motivation; their decisions are strictly influenced by monetary 
rewards and punishments. Because locals comprise a majority of the total municipal population, 
statistical significance was still found to exist between normative and image motivations and 
compliance. 
 
Instrumental Motivations 
The positive relationship between instrumental motivations and compliance for both 
locals and migrants validates Becker’s theoretical hypothesis that decreasing utility from 
violation due to more severe punishment would decrease the level violation (1968). In particular, 
the results show that variable cost (penalties incurred from each violation) is more strongly 
related to compliance than fixed cost (additional costs incurred bi-annually), which came as no 
surprise given the frequency and magnitude of the variable cost of violation. As a note on 
enforcement, the optimal level of compliance is not necessarily 100% and subject to discussion. 
Zhao et al (2016) discusses the potential benefits of policy leakage and distinguishes the 
government’s intentional policy leakage from its incapacity of full enforcement. While changes 
in enforcement level is related to compliance, for the instrumental perspective does not solely 
explain the motivation behind compliance for locals; indeed, the presence of normative and 
image motivations for compliance implies that there are more important changes in governance 
and policy that affect compliance than increasing fines or improving the surveillance system. 
Moreover, the absence of normative and image motivations for migrants is potentially 
bothersome. 
 
Normative and Image Motivations 
The broad nature of the statements pertaining to obligation to obey underscores the 
importance of the positive relationship between obligation to obey and compliance for locals. 
Other studies used obligation statements specific to the case at hand. Yagil (1998b) used the 
statement, “A driver should obey all traffic laws, regardless of whether they seem logical or not.” 
The statements used here did not address the auction policy specifically; it queried about the 
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respondent’s general sense of obligation to obey all laws. Hence, these positive relationships are 
tremendously encouraging for policymakers as they can depend on local hukou holders’ 
normative compliance across a spectrum of policies out of deference to authority. Moreover, the 
perception of the legitimacy of authorities can be improved through adjusting police behavior to 
foster a stronger perception of procedural fairness (Tyler, 2006). This provides policymakers 
with an additional means to increasing enforcement to increase compliance for locals.  
The importance of legitimacy in compliance begs the question of how to obtain 
legitimacy, a core topic of research in political science. Max Weber states that legitimacy 
manifested in any one or any combination of three types: traditional legitimacy, charismatic 
legitimacy, and rational-legal legitimacy (O’Neil, 2010); many forms of government, not just 
democracy, may obtain legitimacy. It is beyond the scope of this paper to decipher the precise 
form of government in China and how it ought to strengthen its legitimacy, but it is worth noting 
that compliance depends on legitimacy to a significant extent. 
The representation of morality by statements pertaining to stricter enforcement and the 
fact that primal importance of morality as motivation for compliance yield the intuitive yet 
important conclusion that people comply voluntarily with rules that they deem appropriate. In 
fact, for local hukou holders, the strongest motivation for compliance was morality. For 
policymakers, this result implies that the public’s agreement with the substance of laws and 
regulations provides the greatest source of voluntary compliance. However, disagreement with 
particular laws or regulations could make compliance level for local hukou holders fall below 
what the expected punishment and enforcement level would predict. Turning to the relationship 
between morality and socio-demographics, the results indicate that those with college education 
were less likely to support further restriction of non-local license plates. This may be interpreted 
as that college-educated residents prioritize the freedom to use the roads ahead of addressing the 
issues associated with overcrowding the roads. 
The importance of image motivation suggests that public campaigns to promote the social 
significance of Shanghai license plates could increase compliance. Although the literature on the 
effectiveness of public campaigns in transportation such as ones against drunk driving shows that 
they have at best achieved mixed results, the fact that image motivation is significant in 
compliance in this particular case suggests that there is potential for increasing image motivation 
to raise compliance for local hukou holders. We refer to normative and image motivations 
collectively as non-instrumental motivations. 
A significant relationship between non-instrumental motivations and compliance exists 
for the aggregate population because the relationship is particularly strong for local hukou 
holders. This relationship does not exist for migrants, meaning that non-instrumental motivations 
do not influence migrants’ decision to comply. The investigation into the modulating effect of 
hukou was undertaken because of the socioeconomic divide it poses in Chinese society, and 
hence we hypothesized that normative factors would influence locals’ compliance differently 
than they would migrants’ compliance. The results were even more striking—normative factors 
had no statistically significant impact on migrants when they decide whether to comply with the 
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law. In addition, as the coefficients of determination in Table 3 indicate, the model incorporating 
all three types of motivations fits much better for locals than for migrants. 
The absence of the relationship between non-instrumental factors and compliance for 
migrants is a significant result of this paper and a very problematic finding for policymakers. For 
a large and growing fraction of the urban population, authorities cannot obtain greater 
compliance through improving procedural fairness or establishing laws and regulation that have 
greater public support or promoting them through public campaigns. The issue indicated by the 
results is not that migrants have lower levels of legitimacy, morality, or image of the local 
license plate. Authorities can promote normative and image factors through changes in police 
procedure, adjusting particular parts of laws and regulations, and initiating public campaigns. 
The issue is the lack of relationships between these factors and compliance. It is not a sustainable 
state of governance if the authorities would have to solely rely on increasing punishments or the 
likelihood of apprehension by spending more public resources on enforcement to obtain greater 
compliance. The significant contribution of normative and image motivations to compliance in 
locals bears positive implications for compliance, but the absence of that in migrants is worrying. 
If only instrumental motivations matter, then the government is really constrained in terms of 
how it can go about keeping social order.  
 
Implications for Research 
This paper advanced the framework for compliance research in three ways. First, socio-
demographic variables were examined in relation to both compliance and motivations for 
compliance. This fosters the understanding of compliance by pinpointing how motivations vary 
across different sectors of society and consequently provides potential solutions for government 
to tailor policy approaches in accordance with these variations.  Second, the modulating effect of 
hukou was incorporated into the compliance framework and significant differences were found 
between locals and migrants. The lack of normative and image motivations is problematic for 
authorities. Future research into compliance ought to consider this sharp socioeconomic divide 
when sampling and analyzing data. Third, instrumental motivation was separated into fixed and 
variable components. Given that the latter has potential to incur much greater monetary losses 
than the former, it was unsurprising that variable cost proved to be of greater significant in 
compliance. Future research ought also to consider the distinction between variable and fixed 
cost to make the results more robust. 
There are several limitations to this study. First, it must be stated that underreporting bias 
due to fear of potential consequences is a cause for concern for data validity; hence, 28% could 
be an underestimate of the actual noncompliance rate. Second, the lack of quantitative metrics 
for instrumental motivation other than usage is another limitation since incentives and 
probabilities can be quantified and numerical results—even if they show low elasticity—would 
greatly help policymakers. Third, our data and structural equation models can only evidence that 
the relationships between normative and image motivations and compliance is non-existent for 
migrants. The paper cannot directly speak to the reason or mechanism behind such non-existence. 
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Additional research is required to understand the fundamental differences in motivation structure 
between locals and migrants. Lastly, it bears reiterating that there are more dimensions of various 
forms of motivations than those measured in this study (Johnson et al, 2014). For example, 
legitimacy can be measured in terms of both the obligation to obey and support for the 
authorities. Additional dimensions of legitimacy require context-specific questions and vary 
from case to case, but they still warrant consideration in the study of legitimacy and compliance.  
The limitations of this study calls for future surveys exploring motivations behind 
compliance to include a greater number and variety of statements addressing the various aspects 
of normative and image motivations behind compliance. For instrumental motivation, the 
questionnaire should ask about the perceived probabilities of detection and the perceived cost of 
compliance (license plate price) to help researchers attain a clearer understanding of the 
compliance model. One potential way to address underreporting bias is to use available statistics 
on violations for particular groups in conjunction with self-reporting. For example, Tyler and 
Fagan (2008) used precinct level crime statistics in addition to self-reporting of crimes for a 
compliance study of New York City residents. As mentioned in introducing the framework of 
this model, the interactions among various motivations were not investigated in this paper. 
Understanding the crowding effects, particularly that of instrumental motivation on normative 
motivation, is critical for governments in optimizing resources and policies (Benabou and Tirole, 
2006). Policy instruments that reduce normative motivation to comply can be especially wasteful. 
 
Acknowledge 
We would like to thank the Samuel Tak Lee Real Estate Entrepreneurship Laboratory at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology for partial financial support for this research.  
  
Page 16 of 25
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
  17 
References 
Afridi, F., Li, S.X., and Ren, Y. (2015). Social Identity and Inequality: The Impact of China's 
Hukou System. Journal of Public Economics, 123, 17-29. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human decision 
processes, 50(2), 179-211. 
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009). Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and 
monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. The American Economic Review, 544-555. 
Bar-Ilan, Avner, and Sacerdote, B. (2001). The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection 
in a Series of Experiments. Working Paper No. 8638. Cambridge, MA: NBER. 
Bentler, P.M., and Bonett, D.G. (1980). Significance Tests and Goodness of Fit in the Analysis 
of Covariance Structures. Psychological Bulletin, 88(3), 588–606. 
Becker, Gary S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political 
Economy J POLIT ECON. 76(2), 169-217. 
Bénabou, R., and Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. American Economic 
Review 96(5). 1652-678. 
Chen, X., and Zhao, J. (2013). "Bidding to Drive: Car License Auction Policy in Shanghai and 
Its Public Acceptance." Transport Policy 27, 39-52. 
Coughlin, J. F. (1994). The Tragedy of the Concrete Commons: Defining Traffic Congestion as a 
Public Problem. In D. A. Rochefort, & R. W. Cobb (Eds.), The Politics of Problem 
Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda (pp. 138-158). Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas.  
Eggert, H., and Lokina, R. (2009). Regulatory Compliance in Lake Victoria Fisheries. 
Environment and Development Economics Envir. Dev. Econ. 15(2). 197. 
Elliott, M. A., Armitage, C. J., & Baughan, C. J. (2003). Drivers' compliance with speed limits: 
an application of the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 
964. 
Golob, T.F. (2003). Structural equation modeling for travel behavior research. Transportation 
Research Part B: Methodological. 37(1), 1-25. 
Groeneveld, R. A. (2011). "Quantifying Fishers' and Citizens' Support for Dutch Flatfish 
Management Policy." ICES Journal of Marine Science 68(5). 919-28. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162(3859). 1243-248.  
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Myhill, A., Quinton, P., & Tyler, T. R. (2012). Why do 
people comply with the law? Legitimacy and the influence of legal institutions. British 
journal of criminology, 52(6), 1051-071. 
Johnson, D., Maguire, E.R., and Kuhns, J.B. (2014). Public Perceptions of the Legitimacy of the 
Law and Legal Authorities: Evidence from the Caribbean. Law & Society Review 48(4), 
947-78.  
Liu, D. (2008). Analysis on the effectiveness of Shanghai’s license auction policy – from public 
policy aspect. Industrial and Science Tribune 7, 130–133. 
Kuperan, K., Sutinen, J.G. (1998). Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance 
in Fisheries. Law & Society Review 32(2), 309. 
Maccallum, R.C., M.W. Browne, and H.M. Sugawara, (1996), Power Analysis and 
Determination of Sample Size for Covariance Structure Modeling. Psychological 
Methods, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1996, pp. 130–149. 
Page 17 of 25
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
  18 
Madrigal-Ballestero, R, Schlüter, A. and Lopez, M.C. (2013), What Makes Them Follow the 
Rules? Empirical Evidence from Turtle Egg Harvesters in Costa Rica, Marine Policy, 37, 
270-77. 
Martín, Ana M., Bernardo Hernández, Martha Frías-Armenta, and Stephany Hess, (2012), Why 
Ordinary People Comply with Environmental Laws: A Structural Model on Normative 
and Attitudinal Determinants of Illegal Anti-ecological Behaviour, Legal and 
Criminological Psychology Leg Crim Psychol, 19(1), 80-103. 
Metcalfe, Robert, and Paul Dolan, (2012). Behavioural Economics and Its Implications for 
Transport, Journal of Transport Geography, 24, 503-11. 
Muthén, L., and B. Muthén (2007). Mplus User’s Guide, 5th ed. Muthén & Muthén, Los Angeles,  
Nielsen, Jesper Raakjær, and Christoph Mathiesen, (2003), Important Factors Influencing Rule 
Compliance in Fisheries Lessons from Denmark, Marine Policy 27(5), 409-16. 
O'Neil, P. H. (2010). Essentials of Comparative Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Parker, C. (2006). The “compliance” trap: The moral message in responsive regulatory 
enforcement. Law & Society Review, 40(3), 591-622. 
Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S. (1991). A Note on Optimal Fines when Wealth Varies Among 
Individuals. American Economic Review, 81, 618-621. 
Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta, and Graham Epstein. (2015). The Impacts of Deterrence, 
Social Norms and Legitimacy on Forest Rule Compliance in Ghana. Forest Policy and 
Economics, 55, 10-20. 
Stigler, G. J. (1970). The Optimum Enforcement of Laws. Journal of Political Economy J 
POLIT ECON, 78(3), 526-36. 
Tyler, T.R. (2006). Why People Obey the Law. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Tyler, T.R., and Fagan, J. (2008) Legitimacy and cooperation: why do people help the police 
fight crime in their communities? Ohio St J Crim L 6:231–276 
Winter, Søren C. and May, P. (2001). Motivation for Compliance with Environmental 
Regulations. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management J. Pol. Anal. Manage. 20(4), 
675-98. 
Xie, C. and Parker, D. (2002). A Social Psychological Approach to Driving Violations in Two 
Chinese Cities. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 5(4), 
293-308. 
Yagil, D. (1998a). Gender and Age-related Differences in Attitudes toward Traffic Laws and 
Traffic Violations. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 
1(2), 123-35. 
Yagil, D. (1998b). Instrumental and Normative Motives for Compliance with Traffic Laws 
among Young and Older Drivers. Accident Analysis & Prevention 30(4), 417-24. 
Zhang, G, Yau, K., and Chen, G. (2013), Risk Factors Associated with Traffic Violations and 
Accident Severity in China. Accident Analysis & Prevention 59, 18-25. 
Zhao, J., N. Allen, D. Block-Schachter, T. Chen, and A. Lai (2016) Purposeful Policy Leakage: 
Legitimacy and Intentionality of Shanghai’s Non Local Vehicles, working paper. 
Page 18 of 25
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
TABLE 1 Indicators of Motivation Constructs 
 
ID 
Motivation 
Type 
Statement 
Strongly 
agree 
Partially 
agree 
Neutral 
Partially 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Indicators for Obligation (Legitimacy) 
u7 Normative 
I think it's fine to disobey rules that don’t 
make sense. 17% 32% 25% 21% 6% 
u8 Normative 
The general public thinks it's fine to 
disobey rules that don’t make sense. 10% 32% 29% 23% 6% 
   Indicators for Spirit (Morality) 
u3 Normative 
Shanghai should cooperate with nearby 
cities to totally ban Shanghai residents 
registering non-local vehicle licenses. 24% 30% 19% 19% 9% 
u4 Normative 
Shanghai government should totally ban 
non-local vehicles driven on Shanghai's 
roads. 13% 24% 23% 20% 19% 
   Indicators for Image 
u5 Image 
Getting a Shanghai car license makes me 
feel more like a Shanghai citizen. 16% 34% 28% 14% 7% 
u6 Image 
I feel that a person driving a car with a 
Shanghai license plate has more pride. 16% 37% 27% 13% 7% 
   Indicators for Convenience (Fixed cost) 
u1 Instrumental 
Biannual check of vehicles with non-local 
license is very inconvenient. 30% 53% 11% 6% 1% 
u2 Instrumental 
Purchase and sale of vehicles with non-
local license need to take place in the 
license issuing cities, which is very 
inconvenient. 23% 51% 18% 6% 1% 
  Indicator for Usage (Var. cost)        
u9 Instrumental 
How frequently do you use elevated roads 
during your daily commute during rush 
hours? (Converted to weekly frequency)  never 
8% 
once a 
month 
34% 
once 
2 to 3 
weeks 
24% 
1 to 2 
times / 
week 
15% 
3 to 4 
times / 
week 
5% 
5 
times / 
week 
3% 
6 to 7 
times / 
week 
11% 
Due to rounding, sum of proportions of responses may be off by +/- 1% from 100% 
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TABLE 2 Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile of the Sample 
 
Variable Values % of Sample % of Shanghai Population 
Demographic      
Gender Male 51 50 
Age 30 and under 26 33 
 61-65 12 8 
Residency Born in Shanghai 70 N.A. 
Socioeconomic    
Education College and above 54 21 
 Masters and above 10 N.A. 
Employment Employed 78 N.A. 
Income Over 15k CNY 17 N.A. 
Hukou status Have Shanghai hukou 63 61 
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 FIGURE 1 The Structural Equation Model for License Auction Policy Compliance 
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TABLE 3 Goodness of Fit Measures 
 Two-Group Model Aggregate Model 
Observations 
457 (Locals) 
264 (Migrants) 721 
Comparative fit index 0.971 0.958 
Tucker Lewis index 0.938 0.903 
RMSEA 0.027 0.032 
90 Percent C.I. (0.008, 0.040) (0.021, 0.042) 
Chi-squared 136.654 99.849 
Degrees of freedom 108 58 
Coefficient of Determination 
0.376 (Locals) 
0.187 (Migrants) 0.355 
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TABLE 4 Measurement Equations for the Aggregate Model 
Latent Variable Indicator Estimate Est./S.E. 
Obligation U7 0.818 21.803 
Obligation U8 0.698 19.758 
Spirit U3 0.829 32.877 
Spirit U4 0.819 30.664 
Convenience U1 0.829 17.727 
Convenience U2 0.741 17.821 
Image U5 0.923 35.649 
Image U6 0.839 33.889 
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TABLE 5 Structural Equations for the Determinants of Compliance 
  Local   Migrant   Aggregate   
Variable Estimate Est./S.E. Estimate Est./S.E. Estimate Est./S.E. 
Obligation 0.283*** 3.308 0.151 0.952 0.235*** 3.298 
Spirit 0.378*** 4.654 0.104 0.623 0.261*** 3.580 
Convenience 0.062 0.930 0.087 1.030 0.086 1.742 
Usage 0.259*** 5.138 0.180** 2.282 0.214*** 5.318 
Image 0.211*** 3.128 0.090 1.023 0.125** 2.894 
Male -0.018 -0.134 -0.251 -1.659 -0.111 -1.193 
Under 30 -0.077 -0.442 0.519*** 3.258 0.201 1.821 
Over 60 -0.494 -0.999 0.725*** 2.701 0.325 1.570 
College edu 0.050 0.337 0.093 0.535 0.037 0.346 
Grad edu -0.067 -0.348 0.326 1.127 0.092 0.633 
Employed -0.320 -0.691 0.583*** 3.384 0.364** 2.271 
High income 0.341 1.894 0.086 0.365 0.241 1.753 
Hukou     0.375 1.845 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05 
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TABLE 6 Structural Equations for the Determinants of Motivations 
  Obligation Spirit Convenience Usage Image 
  Est.  t Est.  t Est.  t Est.  t Est.  t 
Male 0.131 1.462 -0.094 -1.114 -0.053 -0.602 0.065 0.858 -0.016 -0.195 
Under 30 -0.037 -0.329 -0.019 -0.171 -0.048 -0.409 -0.195** -2.030 -0.058 -0.537 
Over 60 -0.097 -0.467 -0.203 -0.997 -0.078 -0.337 -0.370** -2.093 -0.057 -0.274 
College edu 0.166 1.644 -0.247 -2.575*** -0.018 -0.175 -0.016 -0.178 -0.063 -0.687 
Grad edu -0.162 -1.015 0.141 1.010 -0.121 -0.892 -0.062 -0.516 0.102 0.745 
Employed 0.029 0.182 -0.17 -1.046 -0.173 -0.905 -0.183 -1.295 -0.083 -0.591 
High income -0.001 -0.011 -0.157 -1.316 -0.204 -1.810 0.015 0.141 -0.157 -1.409 
Born in Shanghai -0.062 -0.352 0.308 1.739 0.062 0.328 0.015 0.099 0.294 1.762 
Shanghai hukou 0.106 0.621 -0.129 -0.746 -0.011 -0.058 0.183 1.234 0.071 0.430 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05 
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